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Starting with an interest in basic psychological processes, 
whose complexity is matched only by the difficulty of their 
study, we developed what seemed to us to be more appropriate 
research strategies-the so-called transpositional researchand 
forged a link between the acquisition of native-like second 
language pronunciation ability and certain personality constructs, 
such as empathy. From there we pursued over the years a line of 
inquiry that studied the influence of language on person and 
person on language. While engaging in this basic research we were 
able to reap incidental pay-offs in the several instruments we 
produced: the STP, MME and the MIGIT. 
INTRODUCTION 
Our research group, composed of psychologists, psychiatrists, 
linguists and psycholinguists, has been engaged for the past several 
years in the systematic study of certain personality constructs. 
Beginning with the publication of our Intuition Study in 1965 
(Guiora et. al. 1965) we were concerned with what we called 
“comprehending modalities.” “Faced with a variety of diagnostic 
and predictive clinical behaviors,” we wrote, “which do not lend 
themselves to obvious understanding, we are hard put t o  provide 
meaningful formulations to explain these behaviors. In the litera- 
ture dealing with psychological testing, the terms most often used 
to denote the meaningful grasp of less than obvious clinical data 
are inference and intuition, while in the literature dealing with 
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psychotherapy and psychoanalysis the terms empathy and intuition 
are most frequently encountered. The overall impression is that 
these three terms are indeed intended to denote three different 
kinds of processes” (Guiora 1965:779). 
Subsequently, our focus settled on one of these comprehend- 
ing modalities, namely empathy. Empathy we defined as “a process 
of comprehending in which a temporary fusion of self-object 
boundaries, as in the earliest pattern of object relation, permits an 
immediate emotional apprehension of the affective experience of 
the other, this sensing being used by the cognitive functions to 
gain understanding of the other” (Guiora 1965:782). 
Having proposed this definition we were faced with a rather 
serious methodological problem, one not unique t o  us, but con- 
fronted daily by scientists brought up in the empirical tradition: 
what is the best way, or ways, in which we can submit hypotheses 
emerging from the clinical circumstance to a systematic and critical 
examination that will yield lawful relationships between the 
observed phenomena, reliable and valid predictions about future 
events, and the results of which will lend themselves to public 
scrutiny? Clearly, one must realize that clinical research implies a 
systematic attempt to  gain knowledge about human functioning in 
circumstances that are usually significantly different from those of 
the laboratory. The nature of the clinical setting imposes limits on 
both the freedom of data collection and on manipulation of 
subject populations. 
A related but separate problem encountered in clinical 
research involves the difficulties of operationalizing and measuring 
personality constructs in general. The construct of empathy has 
proved particularly problematic in this regard. Recognizing the 
limitations of reductionist and analogue research strategies that are 
usually offered to alleviate the situation described above, we 
abandoned attempts to achieve better operationalizations. Instead, 
we tried to identify another realm of behavior where the phe- 
nomena first observed in the clinical situation could be assumed 
also to exist. This other realm of behavior, however, unlike the 
original clinical circumstance, would be such as to lend itself 
readily to the manipulation of variables and populations-to 
rigorous empirical research. We called this strategy transpositional 
research (Guiora 1970). 
The realm of behavior selected for transposing the study of 
empathy was second language pronunciation. We hoped that if a 
connection between empathy and second language pronunciation 
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could be established, this finding could be applied back to the 
clinical situation. 
Language and Empathy 
Thus the initial phase of our research grew out of the idea 
that two superficially different kinds of phenomena, empathy, an 
internal psychological process, and pronunciation, an externally 
observable and thus more readily evaluable behavior, are directly 
related to  each other. Empathy, perhaps most simply described as 
the ability to put oneself in another’s shoes, has appeared under 
different names in virtually all fields concerned with human social 
behavior. Clinical psychology and psychiatry have viewed empathic 
ability as a prerequisite for successful psychotherapeutic practice. 
Developmental and social psychology as well as sociology have 
emphasized the importance of empathy, frequently referred to as 
person perception or role-taking, in the socialization of the indi- 
vidual. In linguistics and philosophy the concept that comes closest 
to reflecting some of our concerns is pragmatics. In very general 
terms pragmatics is that aspect of meaning which is concerned with 
the behavioral implications of an utterance for both speaker and 
hearer. Those studying the pragmatics of communication do not 
necessarily raise questions about the psychological processes under- 
lying the relative success or appropriateness of an exchange. 
Whatever construct one uses, it  is, we think, impossible to  attempt 
to understand communication in depth without using some con- 
cept which takes into account the wealth of non-grammatical 
knowledge that human beings bring to bear on their communica- 
tions with others. 
The choice of authenticity of pronunciation as the realm of 
behavior for testing hypotheses about empathic capacity was based 
on the notion that both pronunciation ability and empathy are 
profoundly influenced by the same underlying processes, namely, 
permeability of ego boundaries. In order to sharpen the conceptual 
focus, a mediating construct, language ego, was recently intro- 
duced. Like the concept of body ego, language ego is a matura- 
tional concept and likewise refers to self-representation with 
physical outlines and firm boundaries (Guiora 1972). 
The notion of boundaries is important. In the formative stages 
of development there is a state of flux: boundaries are more 
flexible, more easily permeated. Once ego development is con- 
cluded this flexibility is sharply restricted and there will be marked 
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individual differences later in the range of flexibility or plasticity 
of ego boundaries. 
The implications of this for second language learning are clear. 
With pronunciation viewed as the core of language ego, and as the 
most critical contribution of language ego to  self-representation, we 
see that the early flexibility of ego boundaries is reflected in the 
ease of assimilating native-like pronunciation by young children; 
the later reduced flexibility is reflected in the reduction of this 
ability in adults. A t  this point we can link empathy and pronuncia- 
tion of a second language. As conceived here, both require a 
temporary relaxation of ego boundaries and thus a temporary 
modification of self-representation. Although psychology tra- 
ditionally regards language performance as a cognitive-intellectual 
skill, we are concerned here with that particular aspect of language 
behavior that is most critically tied to self-representation. 
Teachers of second languages have frequently observed that 
the ability to speak a new language authentically, that is, to 
assimilate or approximate native-like pronunciation, cannot be 
totally accounted for by the learner’s intelligence, motivation or 
skill in language training. And it does not seem to be modified to  
any great extent by training or effort (Carroll et al. 1967). 
Pronunciation, unlike the lexical and grammatical aspects of 
language learning, seems to  have a developmental history all its 
own. While young children learn foreign languages with relative 
ease, around puberty their pronunciation skills seem to be 
dramatically reduced, although general language learning capability, 
lexical and grammatical skills etc. are not lost. Beyond this period 
it is almost impossible to acquire native-like pronunciation in a 
second language. Turning this around, we might say that it 
becomes impossible to  lose totally one of the most salient identify- 
ing characteristics of any human being, a means by which we 
identify ourselves and are identified by others, namely, the way we 
sound. 
A number of suggestions have been made in an attempt to 
explain the reduction in pronunciation skills at puberty. Scovel has 
argued that it may well be due to the completion of lateralization 
of the speech function (Scovel 1969). Sapon has suggested that 
progressive loss of flexibility of the speech organs may be the 
cause (Sapon 1952). Our argument here does not discount these or 
other factors, but emphasizes, rather, the influence of develop- 
mental, ego-psychological factors. While of course language is a 
universal human institution, ethnically or culturally defined com- 
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munities employ particular languages because of their particular 
social or cultural histories, and every individual talks in a particular 
way that is his own personal synthesis of the language material of 
the groups to which he belongs. 
Thus, language has universal, cultural and personal aspects, 
which make it a fascinating meeting place of universal humanity 
and cultural diversity. A t  different times in the history of lin- 
guistics either its universality or its diversity has been the dominant 
interest; we are currently in a period of renewed interest in the 
universal aspects of language. 
The various features which have been postulated as universals 
of language include on the one hand its purely formal aspects of 
design and structure and on the other its substantive aspects. These 
latter features seem to be directly related to  universals of human 
physiology, psychology and communicative experience. It is 
obvious, for example, that all languages draw upon a particular 
restricted set of sounds, which are under constraints imposed by 
the anatomy and physiology of the human vocal tract. This is 
essentially the same for all human beings. 
Within this universal set of possible language sounds each 
language has its own, fairly unique, set of sounds which are used 
meaningfully by its speakers. Each of the sounds in this meaningful 
set is used to differentiate a word from all the other words in that 
language. In English, for example, there is a set of stop consonants, 
such as those symbolized by the letters b, d ,  g, which are 
pronounced with some degree of vibration of the vocal cords, 
while their counterparts, symbolized by p ,  t, k ,  are not. Each of 
these sounds is meaningful because its distinctiveness makes it 
usable in differentiating words within the language. Because of the 
opposition between such sounds, pi t  is distinguished from bit, tab 
from dab, cot, from got, and so on. Speakers of all languages, 
however, have many sound variations in their inventories which are 
not used meaningfully. In American English, for example, speakers 
regularly insert a glottal stop at the beginning of the vowel “I.” 
Inserting this sound conveys absolutely no linguistic information in 
the sense that differentiating between p and b does. Instead, it is 
part of a myriad of subtle pronunciation details which make these 
speakers sound like what they are, namely, native speakers of 
American English. 
Likewise, the voiceless stop sounds p, t, k ,  have subtle 
pronunciation variations for speakers of American English. When 
they occur at the beginning of a stressed syllable, as in par, tar, 
car, they are followed by a noticeable puff of air, an aspiration; 
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consequently, there is a noticeable time lag before the voicing of 
the vowel begins. When these sounds are preceded by an s, 
however, as in spar, star, scar, they are pronounced without 
aspiration, so that the vowel follows the release of the stop with 
virtually no delay. In other languages such sounds behave differ- 
ently. In French, for example, p ,  t, k,  are not followed by 
aspiration even before stressed vowels. 
Another example of language-specific utilization of a universal 
phonetic feature is the pitch of the voice. Whenever the vocal 
cords vibrate they generate a sound of specific frequency, which is 
perceived as a specific pitch. However, the utilization of such pitch 
changes varies from one language to  another. In Mandarin Chinese, 
for example, there are four distinct pitch patterns, or “tones,” 
which can be a feature of any syllable. Thus, the syllable ma, 
pronounced with each of the four tones (high level, high-rising, low 
fall-rising, falling) represents at  least four distinct words (actually 
more than four, since there are many homophones in Chinese). 
Other languages (Thai, Vietnamese) use tones too, but the number 
and specific pitch patterns of these tones differ from those used in 
Mandarin Chinese. In English, by way of contrast, the meaningful 
pitch patterns, usually called “intonations,” are characteristic not 
of words but of phrases or sentences. English speakers use pitch to 
change the functional meanings of whde sentences-to indicate 
statements, questions, commands, etc., or, on a quite different 
level, as involuntary manifestations of interest, joy, boredom, 
exasperation, etc. While other languages also make use of intona- 
tions, the specific pitch patterns used in the intonation of French or 
Russian, for instance, differ from those used in English. 
Thus, superimposed upon the speech sounds of the words one 
chooses to utter are sounds which give the listener information 
about the speaker’s identity. The listener can decide whether what 
one is saying is sincere or insincere. Ridicule the way I sound, my 
dialect, or my attempts at pronouncing French and you will have 
ridiculed me. Ask me to  change the way I sound and you ask me to 
change myself. To speak a second language authentically is to  take on 
a new identity. As with empathy, it is to step into a new and 
perhaps unfamiliar pair of shoes. 
During the complex activity of talking many of the features 
we have been discussing go unnoticed. We may respond appropri- 
ately to meaningful oppositions, such as the difference between p 
or b ,  or to the difference between a questioning and a command- 
ing intonation, but we do not normally give attention to the 
specific nature of the difference. As for meaningless articulatory 
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distinctions, such as the use of aspirated or unaspirated stops 
mentioned above, or the precise pitch changes which constitute 
the intonations of English and differentiate them from those, for 
example, of French, we are also usually quite unconscious of them. 
Even when speaking in a normal way, slowly and with careful 
enunciation, we do not attend to most of these minutiae of 
pronunciation. N o  doubt this is because they are too numerous. 
Details of pronunciation necessarily become a matter of habit, 
which leaves us free to concentrate on the matter, rather than the 
manner, of our utterances. 
One of the goals in learning either a first or a second language 
is to make detailed pronunciation habitual. The minutiae of 
pronunciation are part of one’s language identity and are what 
makes one identifiable by his speech patterns as an American, 
another as a Swede, and so on. Speaking the way we do reflects 
what we are, but in ways too subtle and too numerous for us to 
keep track of. Each one of us has a set of pronunciation habits 
which are invariable unless factors in our make-up can make us 
more flexible, unless we have the ability to  step outside of our 
“language shoes” and expand our identity in some way. We 
hypothesized that this ability to shed our native pronunciation 
habits and temporarily adopt a different pronunciation is closely 
related to empathic capacity. 
I t  was with this background that we constructed an instru- 
ment called “The Standard Thai Procedure” (Guiora, et. al. 1972). 
The Standard Thai Procedure (STP) was developed for the purpose 
of assessing second language pronunciation ability. For such an 
instrument to be maximally useful, it had to  meet a number of 
important criteria. The basic requirement was that of appropri- 
ateness for use with almost any population regardless of age, 
education, etc. The next important consideration was that of the 
particular language to  be chosen for use in the test. The choice of 
Thai as the test language was based on its general unfamiliarity to 
native speakers of English. In addition Thai appears to  be relatively 
easy for English speakers to pronounce yet it has a number of 
sound features which make it distinctively different and quite 
distant from English. While a number of languages fit the above 
criteria, Thai was particularly attractive because of the availability, 
at The University of Michigan, of native speakers of Thai, able to 
evaluate pronunciation performance. 
The STP consists of a master tape recording of 34 test items 
(ranging in length from 1 to  4 syllables) separated by a 4 second 
pause. The voicer is a female native Thai speaker. During testing 
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the master tape is played and a two-track tape recording is made, 
with the test stimuli recorded on one track and the subjects’ 
responses on the other. The subject is instructed to  listen carefully 
to each utterance and then to imitate it immediately afterward. 
Total testing time, including instructions is approximately 4-1 /2 
minutes. 
The scoring procedure for the STP is currently under revision. 
The basic evaluation method involves rating tone, vowel and 
consonant quality for selected phonetic units on a scale of 1 
(poor), 2 (fair), or 3 (native-like). Data tapes are rated in- 
dependently by three native Thai speakers, trained in pro- 
nunciation evaluation. A distinct advantage of the STP as a test of 
pronunciation ability is that it can be used with naive subjects. It 
bypasses the necessity of first teaching subjects a second language. 
One area where it has great potential use is the study of 
pronunciation abilities in young children. As has been noted, 
children can learn to speak a second language with native-like 
pronunciation up to about nine to twelve years of age; after this 
age this ability seriously decreases. No  systematic investigation of 
this phenomenon has ever been undertaken, although it suggests 
several questions. Is this ability categorically present in children 
younger than nine to twelve, or is it developmental in nature? 
What is the relationship between the ability to produce sounds in 
one’s own language, the latter being thought of as a developmental 
process culminating around the age of twelve, and the ability to 
learn native-like pronunciation in a second language? If the ability 
to pronounce a second language with native-like authenticity is 
indeed phase-specific and not a stable characteristic, what then is 
the course of its development? 
At present we are involved in analyzing the performance on 
the STP of 120 children of both sexes from lower-middle class 
families. We are doing this study concurrently with a detailed 
analysis of their pronunciation abilities in their native language, 
American English. With this kind of investigation we hope to gain 
some insight into the process and provide some answers to the 
kind of questions just raised. 
Language and Person 
In order to empirically test the hypothesis of a direct 
relationship between empathy and second language pronunciation 
we were faced with the basic problem of finding an adequate 
means of measuring empathy. After considering a number of 
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different measures we elected to use a modification of a technique 
reported by Haggard and Isaacs called Micromomentary Expression, 
or MME (Haggard and Isaacs 1966). These researchers found that 
showing motion pictures of patients in psychiatric interviews at 
slower than normal speeds allowed observers to  see facial ex- 
pressions suggesting intense feelings that were not apparent at 
normal film speed. 
In 1966 a pilot study was performed by Guiora et al. in 
which silent film clips of a psychiatric interview were shown to 
subjects at varying speeds (Guiora et al. 1967). The subjects were 
instructed to indicate each observed change in facial expression. A 
significant relationship was found between MME scores and 
authenticity of pronunciation for fourteen teachers of French. In a 
second experiment, 28 subjects were given a series of tests, 
including the MME, and then were taught basic conversations in 
Japanese in four, one-hour sessions (Taylor et. al. 1969). Pro- 
nunciation was evaluated by native Japanese speakers on general 
authenticity and specific phonetic details for five spontaneous 
sentences, repeated after the instructor said them. Differences in 
pronunciation skills were significantly related to two clusters of 
variables representing independent personality constructs, namely, 
empathy and intuition. 
These two studies led to a large-scale study which again 
sought to  establish a relationship between empathy and the ability 
to pronounce a second language. The subjects were 401 students at 
the Defense Language Institute, both East and West Coast 
branches, who were engaged in an intensive three-month course in 
one of five languages: Japanese, Chinese-Mandarin, Thai, Spanish 
and Russian. A t  the start of their course of study the students 
were given a series of tests: four empathy measures, including the 
MME, a personal rigidity test made up of items largely from the 
Authoritarianism Scales, a verbal mental reasoning test, and a short 
questionnaire developed to obtain relevant demographic, motiva- 
tional and previous language experience information. 
After approximately three months, near the end of the 
language course, students were given a test designed to evaluate 
authenticity of pronunciation in the particular language they had 
been studying. This test consisted of a tape recording of ten words 
and ten sentences, pronounced by a native speaker, which the sub- 
jects were asked to repeat. A two-track tape recording was made 
during the testing procedure, of the test itself and of the subjects’ 
responses. The tapes were evaluated independently by three experts 
in each language; analyses were done separately for each language. 
Among the five highest correlations for each of the five languages, 
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at least two of the variables were measures of empathy. Of all the 
empathy measures, the MME was the most consistent. It was 
among the five highest predictors of all five languages; with the 
exception of the Russian group, it exceeded the magnitude of the 
correlation between Army Language Aptitude scores and authen- 
ticity of pronunciation. Our conclusion was that we had indeed 
shown that empathic ability as measured by the MME is an 
important variable in the ability to authentically pronounce a 
second language (Guiora et. al. 197213). 
Thus encouraged, we decided to attack the problem of the 
proposed link between empathy and pronounciation through 
experimental manipulation. We had hypothesized that underlying 
the altering of the sound of one’s speech is a process of altering 
one’s self-representation. Such alteration requires some degree of 
flexibility of psychic processes or permeability to ego boundaries. 
Suppose, then, that we were to attempt experimentally to increase 
this flexibility and then ask people to imitate foreign language sounds? 
Our prediction was that increased flexibility would lead to  superior 
pronunciation. 
The easiest means of inducing this flexible psychic state was 
through alcoholic drinks. Alcohol, a depressant, is often said to 
lower inhibition. Most studies of the effects of alcohol on various 
types of performance show impairment of functioning at  many 
levels. However, a few studies have shown that certain types of 
performance may be enhanced when the blood alcohol level is 
moderate to low. 
In 1972 we conducted a study in which 87 male subjects 
were given drinks containing 0, 1, 1-1/2, 2 or 3 ounces of alcohol. 
Subjects assigned to each treatment condition were equated for 
body weight and Scholastic Aptitude Test scores. Half of the 
subjects, which we will refer to as the “non-sugar group,” were 
told to avoid eating or drinking after lunch on the day of the 
experiment. The other half, the “sugar group,” were told to  eat a 
candy bar one hour prior to  testing, which took place during the 
early evening. Ten minutes after finishing their drinks subjects were 
taken to a separate room and tested on two measures: the Digit 
Symbol Test, a sub-test of the Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale, 
and the Standard Thai Procedure (The STP described previously), 
which, as was discussed earlier, had been developed specifically to 
assess second language pronunciation ability. While we had already 
found a relationship between empathy and second language pro- 
nunciation, we hoped in this study to establish independent validity 
of the STP as a potential, indirect measure of empathic ability. 
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The findings of this study were that in the sugar group there 
was a highly significant effect on pronunciation scores associated 
with the amount of alcohol ingested. Considering each condition 
separately, one and a half ounces of alcohol produced significantly 
higher pronunciation scores than no alcohol, while two and three 
ounces of alcohol produced significantly lower pronunciation 
scores than no alcohol. For the non-sugar group there was no 
significant effects associated with the amount of alcohol consumed. 
In contrast to these differences between the two groups in 
pronunciation scores, scores on the Digit Symbol Test were 
virtually comparable. That is, while the small amount of food 
consumed by the sugar group was sufficient to  balance the effects 
of one and a half ounces of alcohol and thus enhance pronouncia- 
tion ability, no such enhancement in performance was found on 
what is essentially an intelligence test. In fact, the trend across all 
five treatment conditions for both the sugar and non-sugar groups 
was a decrease in performance, although this was not significant. 
Our conclusion to this study was that our hypothesis about 
the nature of the psychological processes involved in pronunciation 
ability was confirmed. A small amount of alcohol, which we 
predicted should lower inhibitions and thus theoretically increased 
permeability of ego boundaries, enhanced the ability to authenti- 
cally pronounce a second language. There appears to be an early 
positive stage of intoxication-positive, that is, for particular per- 
formances which do not demand highly integrated ego functioning, 
such as the Digit Symbol Test. This so-called positive stage, 
however, is very quickly passed so that the relationship between 
pronunciation ability and alcohol consumption is a curvilinear one. 
In short, the Alcohol Study made an important theoretical point 
but has obviously no practical implications for language teaching 
(Guiora et. al. 1972). 
Language and Environment 
In a recent essay H. D. Brown (Brown 1973), reflecting on 
the history of second language teaching, suggested that the time 
has come for a paradigm that will pay proper attention to the 
“affective variables” at play in learning foreign languages. The same 
might be said of the mysterious process through which first 
languages are acquired. The suggestion that the mastery or loss of a 
first or second language is a complex process, in which cognitive 
and affective variables internal to the speaker are interwoven with 
cultural and environmental variables external to  him, may sound 
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obvious. Nevertheless, such a probability is frequently overlooked 
in linguistic and psycholinguistic research. Inquiry has to proceed 
simultaneously, if possible, on two fronts: systematic examination 
both of the relationship between language and personality con- 
structs, and of the relationship between language and cognition. 
Because the two lines of inquiry ultimately converge, we suggest a 
simultaneous parallel approach. 
The relationship between language, cognition and personality 
development is a difficult but intriguing issue, fraught with con- 
troversy and confusion. As a uniquely human attribute language is 
at the very core of human existence. It enables us to recount the 
past, project into the future, rise above the present and the 
concrete, create the abstract, and thus share ourselves and our 
experiences with our fellow creatures. But one may legitimately 
ask, what facilitates what? Is language the releaser (In Lorenz’s 
sense) of cognition? Does it enable human beings to conceptualize 
the world around them and, consequently, does the particular 
language one speaks and the extent one speaks it provide differ- 
entiated opportunities to entertain hypotheses about the world? In 
sum, does language shape the way we perceive and conceptualize 
processes, events and objects around and within us, or does 
cognition generate its most perfect expression-language? 
One possible starting point for this inquiry is the linguistic 
relativity hypothesis most commonly associated with Sapir and 
Whorf (although the idea of linguistic relativity antedates Whorf 
and was expressed in quite Whorfian terms by Lee (Lee 1938)). 
Whorf’s statement of the hypothesis is summarized by Carroll: 
“The structure of a human being’s language influences the manner 
in which he understands reality and behaves with respect to it.” 
(Carroll 1956). Although the hypothesis has been in the literature 
for quite some time, experimental probings have been too few to 
settle the issue. 
We have already raised the question of the relationship 
between language and self-representation. Our current studies 
address the question of the relationship between grammatical 
gender and gender rules in a language, and the development of 
gender identity. As a corollary to this we have asked, does 
grammatical assignment-grammatical genderin one’s native 
language influence the way in which male or female characteristics 
are assigned to essentially asexual objects? 
Earlier we discussed some language-specific uses of phonetic 
universals. Let us now turn to semantic universals. I t  is evident 
that these too can be related to  universal aspects of human 
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experience. All languages, for example, evidently make some kind 
of formal distinction between relations, on the one hand, and the 
related objects, on the other. In English and in many other 
languages simple spatial or temporal relations are encapsulated in a 
set of special grammatical words which we call “prepositions,” 
such as in, on, at, to, and so on. The specific processes by which 
such relational categories are expressed vary from language to 
language. Thus, where English uses prepositions, saying, for 
instance, “the man is in the house,” other languages, like Hindi, 
use postpositions, saying the equivalent of “the man the house in 
is.” Still other languages, such as Finnish, use “local cases,” that is, 
endings fused with the noun, saying the equivalent of “the man is 
house-in,” the last being a single word. And there are yet other 
ways of expressing relations. 
Whatever their means of surface expression, however, the fact 
is all languages have some means of responding to the various kinds 
of simple relations between objects, events or any other related 
“terms.” That such relational items appear to  be language uni- 
versals reflects the universal human experience of learning to 
respond differently to objects or events, and to the relationships 
between them. 
Other universal language categories seem to reflect not so 
much universal human experience with the world in general as 
universal experience with the situations in which language is 
employed for communication. For example, all use of languages 
presupposes a situation in which there are at  least two human 
participants, a performer (that is, a speaker or writer) who 
generates an utterance, and an addressee to  whom the utterance is 
directed. All speech situations necessarily imply the existence of 
these two participant roles and distinguish between the performer 
(first person, in traditional grammatical terminology) and the 
addressee (second person, in traditional terminology). 
All languages also provide means of distinguishing between 
different pragmatic speech functions: commands, for example, 
require immediate, overt action on the part of the addressee. As 
statements they are intended to predispose the addressee to future 
action. Questions, on the other hand, call for an overt linguistic 
response on the part of the addressee. These categories reflect 
universal experience with communicative situations. 
There are, however, many features of language which are 
language-specific, that is, peculiar to particular languages. Lan- 
guage-specific features are acquired by every individual as part of 
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the process of growing up and being integrated into one’s particu- 
lar sociocultural group. 
Some language-specific, culturally acquired features are clearly 
related to the speaker’s environment and way of life. Thus, it is 
obvious why the Eskimo language has many distinct words for 
different kinds of snow, and why Arabic has numerous words for 
different types of camel. More interesting, though, is that despite 
the universality of grammatical features there are language-specific 
differences in the way in which they are related which have no 
obvious relationship to the environment of the particular language- 
bearers. 
For instance, we have mentioned the presence in all languages 
of some means of referring to simple spatial or temporal relations. 
We saw that, although this is undoubtedly a language universal, 
different languages give it different types of surface expression in 
the form of prepositions, postpositions, case endings, and so on. 
Even more interesting than these surface differences in the ex- 
pression of relations, however, is that different languages impose 
profoundly different conceptualizations upon the universally 
experienced category of relations. In other words, in its own 
particular way every language dissects, as it were, the “semantic 
space” covered by simple space or time relations. 
English, for example, with a subset of spatial prepositions, 
distinguishes between exterior relations, which hold towards the 
exterior of something (on, onto, off), and interior relations, which 
hold toward the interior of something (in, into, out-of). A third set 
of relations is neutral, or indifferent, to the distinctions in other 
dimensions: static contiguity (on, in, at), dynamic approach (onto, 
into, to) and departure (off, out-of, from). 
Other languages divide up essentially the same semantic space 
in other ways. Finnish, for example, covers the same semantic 
space with six local cases. This numerical difference (the same 
conceptual area divided into six instead of nine portions) of itself 
suggests that there must be some non-correspondence between the 
English and the Finnish systems, and this is indeed the case. 
Finnish makes essentially the same distinctions as English with 
respect to static versus dynamic oppositions. But with respect to 
exterior versus interior oppositions Finnish totally lacks the neutral 
category represented by at, to, from. The Finnish language thus 
forces its speakers t o  say that something is either on the surface of 
something, or else is in its interior. The Finns cannot neutrally say 
that something is merely at something else, with no reference to  
the exterior or interior. 
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In still another language, Indonesian, there is a basic set of 
three spatial prepositions that distinguish only static contiguity, 
approach and departure. Indonesian absolutely lacks all obligatory 
reference to the opposition of exterior to interior. 
These culturally determined differences, which seem quite 
arbitrary as human or psychological universals, oblige speakers of 
Enlgish, Finnish and Indonesian to conceptualize spatial relations 
in somewhat different ways. 
Another universal is the distinction between the speaker and 
the addressee. Although these are obviously universal participant- 
roles in speech situations, different languages oblige their speakers 
to group these roles in different ways. In English, for instance, the 
speaker is referred to  as I and the addressee as you.  Any group of 
participants that includes the speaker is referred to  as we. The 
single English pronoun we may mean “I together with you” or “I 
and some other person, but not YOU.” In many languages, however, 
one is forced to  use two distinct pronoun forms: an inclusive one 
meaning “I plus you”, and an exclusive one meaning “I and 
someone else, but not you.” In Indonesian the inclusive we is 
“kita,” and the exclusive we is “kami.” This pronoun system thus 
forces the speaker of Indonesian, whenever he uses pronouns, to 
refer explicitly to a distinction which, most of the time, can be 
ignored in English. 
Examples like these are not rare. Indeed, they are the rule 
rather than the exception. Although there are universal broad 
categories common to  all languages every language imposes its own 
detailed categorization upon the way its speakers conceptualize 
experience. Certain specific details of experience in one language 
may be completely ignored in the obligatory grammatical dis- 
tinctions of another. Put another way, the speaker of every 
language is obliged, as he talks, to  look at the world through a 
language-specific “grid” that imposes upon him a particular kind of 
“dissection,” a particular conceptualization. This kind of language- 
imposed, culturally differing dissection of experience constitutes 
what has been called “linguistic relativity.” There can be no doubt 
that, in the sense that the language you speak makes you 
conceptualize in particular ways for the immediate purpose of 
speaking, linguistic relativity is a fact. Some scholars have gone 
further than this, suggesting that language-specific differences of 
conceptualization actually impose a wider difference of world 
outlook upon the speakers of different languages. We have referred 
earlier to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, so-called, after the two 
American linguists who were prominent advocates of this view. 
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One may perhaps question the validity of the Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis, which implies that language determines world outlook 
in a far-reaching way. But it is not completely improbable that 
there are more restricted effects on human cognition that go 
considerably beyond the immediate speech situation. One possible 
area of wider influence that seems to be testable is concerned with 
sex-determined distinctions of gender in languages. 
All languages, of course, have numerous lexical terms, such as 
boy or girl, in which the sex of the referent is part of the meaning 
of the word. When we turn to the grammar, however, we find that 
languages differ greatly in the extent to which sex is built into the 
obligatory categorizations of their grammatical systems. In English, 
for example, use of the third person pronouns he and she usually 
obliges the speaker to note the sex of the referent. In Finnish, on 
the other hand, there is absolutely no prominent distinction like 
he/she, nor are there any other grammatical features that oblige a 
speaker to refer to sex. Other languages, though, notably the 
Semitic group, have sex playing a much greater role in the 
selection of grammatical categories. In Hebrew, for instance, there 
are systematic grammatical distinctions based on sex that are not 
confined, as they are in English, to the third person. In Hebrew 
verbs, the second and third person forms for all tenses reflect the 
sex of the addressee; in the present tense not only the second 
person but the first person as well has a special form to  indicate 
the speaker’s sex. 
We may call such differences in the utilization of sex- 
determined grammatical categories differences in “gender loading.” 
In this sense, we can say that the gender loading of Finnish is zero, 
that of English is very low, and that of Hebrew, high. 
Conceivably, we have here an area where language-imposed 
distinctions may have a significant effect on speakers of the 
language. If this is the case, we might hypothesize that children 
growing up in a Hebrew-speaking community will achieve aware- 
ness of their own sex at  an earlier developmental stage than 
children growing up in an English-or Finnish-speaking community. 
Language and Gender 
In recent years research in the area of psychosexual develop- 
ment has delineated biochemical, genetic, early parenting and 
sociocultural factors. Our present interests are concerned only with 
the development of gender identity and a technique for its 
measure. 
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In this context gender identity refers to a child’s recognition 
of what sex he belongs to, and “gender role” means the sum of 
behaviors, attitudes and expectations that are prescribed for this 
identity. Practically speaking, however, it is very difficult to 
separate these two aspects of psychosexual development. Someone 
who has a problem in forming a clear concept of his gender 
identity will necessarily express this in his “role.” Conversely, the 
factors that influence the formation of gender role will invariably 
mold the gender identity in that person. 
Much research has been done in isolating variables in psycho- 
sexual development. The early transmission of parental attitudes by 
subtle behavioral cues is one important way gender role expec- 
tations are reinforced. Yet another area that seems quite as 
important to the development of gender role and identity is rarely 
considered-the influence of language. In our culture, as soon as a 
baby is born its parents immediately announce its sex by calling 
the baby “he” or “she” rather than “it”. Furthermore, they assign 
the child’s basic self an identity through a given name that is 
usually categorized as male or female. If a child’s given name is 
misleading in describing his sexual identity, it may be the subject 
of much teasing and ridicule-like the hero in the song “A Boy 
Named Sue.” 
As we have noted, in English, only the given name denotes a 
person’s sex. In Polish and Russian, though, the family name as well 
reflects its owner’s sex by assigning different endings for males and 
females. In Hebrew, with its high gender loading, virtually all 
conversations identify the sex of the speaker and the addressee. A 
child raised in a Hebrew-speaking family is thus constantly re- 
minded whether he is a boy or a girl. Finnish, on the other hand, 
as noted before, with its zero gender loading, does not provide 
children with these linguistic cues about their gender identity. 
One of the most commonly used methods for ascertaining 
gender identity in young children is the Gesell procedure (Gesell 
1940) which involves simply posing to the child the question: “Are 
you a little boy or a little girl?” One of the major problems with 
this method is that it provides little context for assessing either the 
validity of the response (even when it appears to  be correct) or the 
meaning of no verbal response. In order to avoid these problems 
we have decided to present some form of gender identification 
question in the context of a series of simple cognitive tasks. 
In selecting tasks, it was essential to  consider the capacities of 
the youngest subjects to be tested (approximately 18 months of 
age) and the appropriateness of the test stimuli for use in other 
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cultures where we intended to  carry out testing. We chose a 
modified sorting procedure which permits the examiner a choice of 
three strategies for eliciting either verbal or nonverbal responses. 
The test itself consists of two tasks: identification of colored 
photographs of familiar objects, dogs and balls, and identification 
of colored photographs of boys and girls. Each of the two tasks 
consists of two trials. In the second trial of the gender task (boys 
and girls), the child is shown a picture of himself taken prior to 
testing. While correct identification of his own photograph; recog- 
nition of self and gender identification provides the basic answer to 
the question of the child’s knowledge of his own gender, the 
criterion for a perfect score on the test requires additionally that 
the child correctly identify all photographs of dogs and balls and 
girls and boys. (Dull et al. 1975). 
In 1973 (Paluszny et  al. 1973) we reported the results of a 
study in which the Michigan Gender Identity Test (MIGIT) was 
administered to 106 children from 16 months to  51 months of 
age. At  25-27 months of age 24% of the children achieved a 
perfect score on the MIGIT. Of the children from 34-36 months of 
age, 73% achieved perfect MIGIT scores and from 37 months on, 
100% of the children had perfect scores on the MIGIT. While girls 
appeared to be developmentally slightly ahead of boys their results 
were not significant. An analysis of error patterns gave support to 
the notion that gender identity is related to general cognitive 
development and that test performance reflects this in an orderly 
and progressive manner. 
Following the collection of the American baseline data we 
administered the MIGIT to 89 toddlers in Israel. These children 
were selected to resemble closely the American sample, with the 
obvious exception of the language factor. 
The findings will be reported separately, when they can be 
compared with data from Finland. Preliminary results seem to 
show, and quite impressively, that Israeli children do indeed have a 
developmental edge over their American counterparts. In other 
words, we find that Hebrew speaking children are more successful 
on the MIGIT at  earlier age levels than are American children. 
Should the Finnish data go in the opposite direction, serious 
thought will have to  be given to  the implications of the findings 
for the linguistic relativity hypothesis. 
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